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The moral demandingness
of socioeconomic human rights
Jan-Christoph Heilinger
This paper addresses the question whether excessive demands for moral
agents speak against a moral framework such as socioeconomic human
rights. In other words, is an account of human rights that embraces wel-
fare rights unsound if it turns out to be extremely burdensome for moral
agents? Section 1 of the paper analyses the relationship between human
rights and the corresponding, potentially overdemanding duties and ar-
gues that not only institutions but also individual agents are addressed by
these duties. Section 2 introduces the moral demandingness objection
(MDO) as a meta-theoretical criterion to judge the soundness of a
moral theory and shows the different ways in which a moral theory
might demand more than agents can do or can be reasonably expected
to do, particularly in the context of human rights. In the paper I focus
on the example of the presumed human right to adequate food and its
corresponding duties. I argue that excessive demands mirror the current
circumstances of extreme but in principle preventable world poverty.
Hence extremely burdensome demands should be taken neither as an
argument against the moral theory of human welfare rights nor as a
pre-emptive exculpation for agents failing to live up to the duties cor-
responding to these rights. However, obligations corresponding to wel-
fare rights are not the only type of obligations for moral agents; hence
moral agents should not always and exclusively strive to fulfill them.
1. Positive human rights-corresponding duties
1.1 The human right to basic necessities
Human rights are widely accepted as an attempt to formulate a minimal
moral framework, transcending narrow local settings and time frames, to
govern the living together of humans. Basic human rights protect di-
mensions of human lives that are of special importance since they
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touch upon fundamental interests and the welfare of human agents.
Think for example of the right to be free from arbitrary coercion, the
right to participate in society, the right to basic means for survival, or
the right to chose one’s own religion. All these rights protect important
elements of an individual’s life, namely the ability to act autonomously,
to engage in social relationships, to have secure subsistence, and to be
culturally active. Because of the general importance of what they aim
to protect, human rights are said to be held by all human beings; and
as such they are supposed to be binding for agents who potentially
have an impact on someone’s human rights. If human rights protect
fundamental interests and the welfare of individuals, their violation con-
stitutes a severe moral wrong.
Hence because of the nature of human rights and their prescriptive
implications for moral agents, a theory of human rights is fundamentally
a moral framework, setting rules which moral agents – be it individuals
or institutions – must abide by if they want to act morally. Such a wider,
interactional view about the scope of human rights that includes differ-
ent types of moral agents – individuals as well as governments and insti-
tutions – is opposed to a narrower, institutional account of human rights
that excludes individuals and exclusively addresses institutions and their
representatives. While the institutional view dominates the current de-
bate about human rights, later on I will engage with the interactional
view.
According to the “generation account” of the history of human
rights (which should only be seen as describing a historical sequence
and not as providing an evaluative hierarchy), one can differentiate
three generations of human rights (cf. Vasak 1977). The first generation
includes basic liberty rights – freedom of assembly, freedom of expres-
sion, etc. – as well as civil and political rights of participation. The sec-
ond generation stipulates welfare rights, or social, economic, and cultur-
al rights; among them a right to basic necessities, basic education, etc.
Often they are positive rights to assistance, contrasting with the presum-
ably exclusively negative rights of the first generation. The third gener-
ation of human rights provides a diverse list of rights including collective
and group rights, a right to sustainability, to a healthy environment, etc.
In the following, I will focus on the second generation of human rights,
because here my question about the moral demandingness of human
rights becomes particularly salient: it addresses fundamental needs and
interests of human beings which, however, go beyond the apparently
Jan-Christoph Heilinger186
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
less controversial negative rights of the first generation without reaching
the even more controversial dimension of the third generation.
One prominent example of a basic human right of the second gen-
eration is the right to an “adequate standard of living” found in article
25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in article 11
of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). Article 11 explicitly includes a right to basic neces-
sities such as food. In the words of Jean Ziegler, the former UN Special
Rapporteur on the right to food, this human right means
“to have regular, permanent and free access, either directly or by means of
financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and suffi-
cient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to
which the consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, in-
dividual and collective fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.” (Ziegler
2001, 2)
This vision includes elements that are extremely unlikely to be widely
realized any time soon for many people. Furthermore, to demand that
food should match cultural traditions seems secondary given the ex-
treme lack of food that would secure sheer survival. However, while
it may be a challenge to properly define “adequate” food and while
one might want to question certain specifications, “adequate” food un-
disputedly includes there being enough food available to guarantee sur-
vival. There is a strong fundamental interest for human agents to be ad-
equately fed, because this seems to be a precondition for engaging into
any kind of human activity and moreover a precondition for enjoying
the first generation liberty rights. To be free from starvation is hence
a particularly pressing and immediate human right.
In our current world, many human beings live under conditions of
severe poverty. Every year, some 8 million humans die prematurely of
hunger (Sachs 2005, 1) and taken together 18 million die prematurely of
poverty-related causes (Pogge 2007, 51). Since the right to basic neces-
sities is said to be a universal human right, held by all and not only by
some humans or under certain conditions, in each individual case of
hunger the human right to basic necessities is disrespected and a moral
wrong occurs.
It is important to keep in mind that it is far from impossible to erad-
icate world poverty and world hunger (cf. e. g. Sachs 2005), given the
amount of food available and both the organizational capacities of mod-
ern societies and their existing financial means. It would certainly in-
volve financial commitment, intense preventive action and a long-
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term engagement to be successful. Yet world poverty is not an un-
changeable fact that has to be taken for granted, even if the demands
and the challenges of eradicating it would be high.
1.2 Rights and corresponding duties
One prominent problem with declaring universal human rights is that it
is often unclear who has to do what to secure these rights or who can be
held responsible for preventing human rights violations from happening.
Griffin argues in a straightforward way that there is a clear match be-
tween rights and obligations, though specifying exactly the content of
a human right may be difficult:
“The content of a human right is also the content of the corresponding
duty. What one party may demand, as of human right, another party has
some sort of obligation to supply. We have only to know the content of
human rights. But deciding that, of course, is not always easy.” (Griffin
2008, 97)
Yet even if we agree that there is, e. g., a human right to adequate food,
the answer to the question about the corresponding obligation is more
complicated than Griffin seems to suggest. After the initial intuitive re-
action that someone should be doing something about world hunger, the
difficulties begin. Often it is impossible to identify a human rights vio-
lator who directly causes the moral wrong in question. Think of struc-
tural human rights violations such as world hunger. While in some cases
bad governance or financial speculations with basic food might be
thought to have a substantial impact on food shortage, in most cases sim-
ple causal attributions of responsibility fail. Who has which obligation in
these cases? This question is crucial, since without counterpart obliga-
tions, basic human rights seem to become futile.
If we stipulate human rights without being specific about corre-
sponding duties, they turn out to be sheer manifesto rights, describing
some ideal without attributing responsibility for how to realize this
ideal (cf. Feinberg 1980). O’Neill, for example, is very critical of such
manifesto rights and hence makes the determination of rights-corre-
sponding duties and their holders a condition for a meaningful concept
of universal rights. She argues that unless we are able to specify counter-
part obligations, all talk of universal rights should be avoided (O’Neill
2005, 432–433).
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To be as specific as possible about determining rights-corresponding
duties, we have to inquire into the relationship between rights and du-
ties. However, given the complexity of the web of human interaction in
which human rights are located – and respected or violated – and given
the generality of basic human rights, the answer to the question of who
has which duty will certainly not be simple. There might be several lay-
ers of obligations, organized according to different potential agents.
After all, human rights do not result from a precise contract made be-
tween two individuals about, say, purchasing something, which
would be specifically about the parties involved and their rights and du-
ties explicitly agreed upon. So it might be that only a basic degree of
specificity is possible when it comes to defining the human rights-cor-
responding duties and the duty bearers.
So, how to further enquire into the duties that correspond to human
rights? One influential general definition of a right has been offered by
Joseph Raz:
“‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights and, other things being
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.” (Raz 1986, 166)
Following Raz, the legitimate interests of an individual justify rights
which in consequence justify the corresponding duties. “Typically
rights are established by arguments about the value of having them.
Their existence depends on there being interests whose existence war-
rants holding others subject to duties to protect and promote them.”
(Raz 2007, 17). For Raz the right is prior and consequently gives rise
to a corresponding duty. Such a hierarchical account however is more
specific about rights than it can be about the derived duties. An alterna-
tive account that puts rights and duties on the same level would instead
stress their “correspondence”, and take rights and duties to refer to dif-
ferent aspects of a single normative relation existing between human
agents. Here one could say that rights and duties are correlative or cor-
responding conclusions of one moral argument made about a relation
between a potential agent and a potential right (cf. Holmgren 1985).
So far, I have spoken about rights generally; talking about human
rights specifically touches upon a somewhat different debate. Raz’s
own understanding of human rights, for example, is more specific
than his general account of rights.1 However, following a moral under-
1 According to his “political” view Raz “regards human rights as rights which are
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standing of human rights, I claim that in the case of human rights as well
the correspondence relationship between rights and duties should be
understood as them being correlative conclusions of moral judgments
about the legitimate interests of human agents.
But how to be specific about the corresponding duties, if one has
already made the moral argument that some dimension of human
lives is sufficiently important to justify a human right to it? Think for
example about the right to the physical integrity of one’s body. Here
clearly no one is allowed to disrespect this right and, say, torture some-
one. Hence all agents have a clearly identifiable duty to refrain from
doing something. No one whatsoever is allowed to interfere with this
fundamental right to physical integrity, because the interest in physical
integrity – as a precondition and an essential element of human lives
– is seen as a sufficient reason to urge others to omit certain types of ac-
tion.
Things are more complicated in the case of second generation
human rights such as the right to adequate food. Here too the interest
in being adequately fed is legitimate because not suffering from hunger
constitutes a fundamental element of human well-being, but the iden-
tification of a corresponding duty bearer is less obvious. In some cases
it is possible to identify someone directly causing the hunger of others
– say through stealing or directly withholding available resources. How-
ever, only some cases are of this relatively simple form. Under the cur-
rent global conditions of huge inequalities in access to food, the basic
rights of some are clearly being violated while it is not so easy to deter-
mine whether someone has directly caused this shortage. Assuming that
we are not able to identify anyone causally responsible for some people’s
shortage of food, what does the basic human right refer to in these cases?
Does it point to nothing?
Following O’Neill, I start from the assumption that rights without
corresponding duties are empty. So we should strive to identify duties
in these cases as well where negative duties of omitting certain types
of action will not suffice to stop the violation of a right from taking
place.2 What is needed here is positive action on the part of some
to be given institutional recognition, rights which transcend private morality”
(Raz 2007, 17). This is a specific understanding of human rights, distinguished
from other types of rights.
2 That negative duties alone may not be sufficient for ending problems is an im-
portant reason not to exclusively follow Pogge’s important insight that indeed
Jan-Christoph Heilinger190
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
other agents. If human rights were to exclude any such positive corre-
sponding duties from their scope they would immediately become inef-
fective and futile.
The demand to include positive duties among the rights-corre-
sponding duties is necessary not only for the welfare rights, but equally
for first generation liberty rights. Although some have argued that lib-
erty rights only correspond to duties of omission, in my view they
also constitute positive duties. Securing freedom of assembly and speech
demands in many cases positive action like providing a police force and
a juridical system to guarantee that no one is unduly coerced (cf. Griffin
2008, 96). Relying on negative duties alone will fail.3 Shue argues in the
same direction when he suggests that generally “three types of duties
correlate” with “every basic right”, including liberty as well as subsis-
tence rights like the right to food: “I. Duties to avoid depriving. II. Du-
ties to protect from deprivation. III. Duties to aid the deprived.” (Shue
1996, 52).
Nevertheless it is especially difficult to identify duty holders for sec-
ond generation human rights. O’Neill has rightly argued: “It is plausible
to think that rights not to be killed or to speak freely are matched by and
require universal obligations not to kill or not to obstruct free speech;
but a universal right to food cannot be simply matched by a universal
obligation to provide an aliquot morsel of food” (O’Neill 2000, 135).
With this she certainly stresses an important point, but no one has claim-
ed that it would be a simple task to precisely identify the matching ob-
ligation for a given right. If one accepts O’Neill’s criticism of sheer
“manifesto” rights – well-meant formulations of admirable aspirations
rather than claimable rights – and allows talk about basic rights only
under the condition that we can specify counterpart obligations, the
task of precisely identifying the holders of rights-corresponding duties
and the exact extent of these duties only becomes even more urgent.
we can identify many of the duties that correspond to rights violations as neg-
ative (Pogge 2008).
3 In fact, given the conditions of massive inequality of human beings – some are
less privileged than others in potentially different ways – liberty taken alone will
often turn out to be suppressive and only rights and entitlements will be liber-
ating.
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1.3 Duty bearers
One answer to the question of who bears the human rights-correspond-
ing duties is given by the official human rights documents themselves.
Article 11 of the CESCR claims that there is a positive duty to provide
enough food and stipulates that the holders of this positive duty are the
states who signed the covenant:
“The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and
through international cooperation, the measures, including specific pro-
grams, which are needed: (a) To improve methods of production, conser-
vation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific
knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and
by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the
most efficient development and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking
into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting
countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world food supplies in re-
lation to need.”
So here, the states declaring the human right to adequate food take
themselves to be responsible for positive measures that meet the needs
of those suffering from hunger and lack of adequate food. However,
are states the sole holders of human rights-corresponding duties? Are in-
dividuals only indirectly involved in securing these basic rights, e. g. by
paying taxes to or working directly for governments who then consti-
tute the international covenant? Or are there some rights-corresponding
moral duties that affect individuals independent of institutional agree-
ments?
Some argue indeed that only official institutions bear human rights-
corresponding duties. Such a political or official view of human rights
has been defended e. g. by Charles Beitz, who understands human rights
as “standards for domestic institutions whose satisfaction is a matter of
international concern” (Beitz 2009, 128). From this point of view
both negative and positive duties are held by institutions and, generally,
there is no personal or individual human rights-corresponding duty to
care for the needy or to guarantee fair trials for everyone. If a human
rights violation takes place the responsibility to act lies with an official
institution. “Nonofficial” individuals may – at best – have a secondary
or indirect duty to support institutions in meeting their human rights-
corresponding duty, e. g. through paying taxes or through exerting pres-
sure on governments, or to help create institutions that in consequence
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will be able to meet rights-corresponding duties.4 However, the primary
duty lies with the institution.
Others argue that – besides official institutions – individuals also have
a human rights-corresponding duty for positive action. To talk of uni-
versal human rights means on this view that they are, as Griffin has it,
“doubly universal”, that they are claims “of all human agents against
all other human agents” (Griffin 2008, 177). The difference between
such an “interpersonal” or “interactional” view and the “political” or
“institutional” view already mentioned is the disputed duty of individ-
uals, while both views agree on the duty of institutions. Such a wider,
interactional view that would allocate duties to both individuals and of-
ficials is also acknowledged, for example, in Nickel’s definition of
human rights. Generally a defender of the institutional view, he argues
that human rights “are political norms dealing mainly with how people
should be treated by their governments and institutions. They are not
ordinary moral norms applying mainly to interpersonal conduct.” (Nick-
el 2010, my italics). With this he stresses the primary focus of human
rights and corresponding duties on states and institutions. However,
the possibility that individuals might have human rights-corresponding
duties too is not ruled out, even if it will be only in a non-ordinary way.
Also Thomas Pogge, generally an adherent to the political view that
imposes duties on institutions, has prominently argued for individuals
having indirectly negative duties of omission in the context of human
rights violations (Pogge 2008, 67). In the following, I will take this a
step further and engage with the not undisputed assumption that
human rights also have corresponding individual positive duties.
I defend an interactional understanding of human rights, mainly be-
cause, even if they have a special status as codified rights, they ultimately
strive to express a basic morality that is to be protected by legal arrange-
ments. Another reason why individuals should also be seen as bearers of
rights-dependent negative and positive obligations, especially in the
context of the right to adequate food, is the following: Given the
utter urgency of the matter – according to the frequent, ongoing, ex-
4 This is how argue e. g. Pogge 2008 or Caney 2007. “All persons have a duty to
bring about and maintain institutions that ensure that persons can enjoy their
human rights.” (Caney 2007, 287). – Of course beyond human rights-depend-
ent duties individuals also have moral duties e. g. not to kill or to help those in
need, but the political account strictly differentiates between moral and political
rights and duties.
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treme violating of fundamental rights – the fact that one can do some-
thing to stop a severe moral wrong from going on may prima facie suffice
to create a corresponding duty to do so. Ashford argues in a similar way
that the responsibility for fulfilling both positive and negative obliga-
tions towards both compatriots and foreigners ultimately lies with
every agent who is able to do so (Ashford 2007). In other words:
sheer ability to stop moral wrongs from taking place generates under
certain circumstances moral reasons that ultimately might take the
shape of duties.5 Another reason to see individuals as bearers of
human rights-corresponding duties is that institutions are ultimately
shaped by or constituted by individuals. They are never independent
of the individuals who made and run them. From this perspective the
difference between institutions and individuals would become a ques-
tion of degree.
Against this, one might argue that an account of individuals bearing
human rights-corresponding duties relies on an undue confusion of
moral duties and human rights-corresponding duties; the first one sim-
ply being the result of some general moral theory directed at individual
behavior, the second simply stemming from the particular human rights
framework focusing on institutional obligations. However, this objec-
tion only makes sense within the narrower political view, where
human rights are defined exclusively as a political instrument obligating
institutions and their representatives. If alongside their undisputed polit-
ical function one also wants to attribute to human rights a degree of uni-
versality that goes beyond the realm of codified statements, one has to
allow for their extension to include individual agents as bearers of
human rights-corresponding duties.6
5 Cf. Griffin, who argues for ability being one among several reason-generating
considerations (Griffin 2009, 102) or Sen who claims: “Human rights generate
reasons for action for agents who are in a position to help in the promoting or
safeguarding of the underlying freedoms. […] In particular, the acceptance of
imperfect obligations goes beyond volunteered charity or elective virtues.”
(Sen 2004, 319). Taking up insights from Young, one could also argue that
being able to help and have a positive impact on someone’s life already consti-
tutes a sufficient degree of social connection, i. e. a relationship including moral
obligations and responsibility (cf. Young 2006).
6 While I defend the interactional view about human rights, I do not claim that
there is more truth in one view than the other. But if the ultimate measure for
moral and human rights theories consists in improving our living together in-
sofar as fundamental interests are respected and the well-being of human beings
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However, if there are universal duties for individuals who are in a
position to do something to prevent a violation of human rights from
happening, and if the current violation of human rights is extreme, is
the moral burden posed on the agents not too high? Can we, the rela-
tively well-off in the affluent countries, – on the grounds of a doubly
universal, interactional account of human rights that allows all agents
to make claims on all other agents – reasonably be said to be the bearers
of corresponding duties to the rights of the 30,000 people who die every
day7 from poverty-related causes? Would an account of human rights
that puts such a high burden on individual agents not be overly demand-
ing and hence unsound?
2. Overdemandingness and welfare-rights
When we seek to determine the exact extent of rights-corresponding
obligations, one major concern in the background is the fear that a
moral theory that poses unreasonably excessive demands may become
itself unreasonable and hence unsustainable. Call this the Moral De-
mandingness Objection (MDO) against a moral theory. This objection,
as a meta-theoretical criterion that evaluates the soundness of a theory
according to its degree of demandingness, can also be put forward
against a theory of welfare rights. In the following I will analyze the dif-
ferent ways in which a moral theory may demand “too much” from
moral agents and ask what might result from this diagnosis for a moral
theory like an account of socioeconomic rights.
The idea that it is unreasonable to demand more from a moral agent
than she can possibly fulfill or can be reasonably expected to fulfill is a
widely accepted principle in moral reasoning from antiquity – “ultra
posse nemo obligatur” – to modern time – “ought implies can.” The
core idea of this principle is that it is a necessary condition of being mo-
rally obliged to do something that we are able to do it or can be reason-
ably expected to do it.
Most often, the MDO is discussed as an argument against conse-
quentialism. Exclusively following an algorithm to maximize the good
is promoted, a too narrow political view does not exhaust all the possibilities for
improvement.
7 And even more die under conditions of an acute famine like the one currently
happening in Somalia and the neighboring countries.
The demandingness of human rights 195
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
is said to be no plausible and appropriate way (Williams 1981, 14–19;
O’Neill 2009, 62–63)8 of moral reasoning for human agents who live
their lives embedded in complex and ambiguous social settings full of
special relations of concern and particular obligations towards some
(cf. also Scheffler 2010). Ultimately a maximizing consequentialism
will result in implausibly high demands that even motivated agents
will necessarily fail to fulfill. While the MDO has been mainly discussed
in this consequentialist context,9 it also proves important for evaluating
the soundness of rights-corresponding duties in rights-based moral the-
ories such as the one in question here.
2.1 Three types of the moral demandingness objection (MDO)
What does it mean to say that a moral theory is too demanding? The
MDO can appear in different forms. A moral theory can be (1) techni-
cally overdemanding, (2) motivationally or psychologically overde-
manding or (3) theoretically overdemanding.
Technical overdemandingness can result first from the epistemic chal-
lenge that our knowledge and understanding of a given complex situa-
tion or setting in which we have to act is insufficient to make a proper
decision. The uncertainty resulting from indeterminate, complex real
world scenarios makes moral obligations potentially overdemanding. If
I just didn’t know that I could have done something or if I am merely
incapable of determining the proper moral action, a theory that asks me
to perform the morally correct action can be said to be unreasonably de-
manding. Griffin for example argues that there are “limits […] to human
understanding” and continues:
“Sometimes we are able to calculate fairly reliable the good and bad con-
sequences of large-scale, long-term social arrangements, but sometimes we
are not. And our failures in understanding are often not peripheral to mor-
ality but at its centre and great enough to leave us with no belief upon
which we should be willing to base our lives.” (Griffin 2008, 98).
8 O’Neills position on the demands of maximizing consequentialism is even
more radical, since she claims that the resulting demands in the end only appear
to be overdemanding, while ultimately they are not demanding enough, since
they are nothing but empty formalism (O’Neill 2009, 62).
9 For a critical discussion of this see Sobel 2007.
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A second form of technical overdemandingness obtains when different
actions that have been simultaneously identified as morally demanded
are mutually exclusive and for this reason impossible to perform. Such
contradictory demands could result from equally urgent moral claims
made by several individuals e. g. to help them in severe distress in a sit-
uation where it is unfeasible for the agent to meet all of these claims si-
multaneously. If there were a moral obligation to help them all, this
would place an excessive burden on moral agents that they would not
be able to meet.
This second form of technical overdemandingness can also take the
form of identifying an incommensurate task for an individual – such as
saving the world from poverty. Here the overdemandingness consists in
the setting of a goal that is incongruent with the abilities of an individual
agent such that it seems to be unreasonable to place this moral demand
on an individual.
A second type of moral overdemandingness is motivational or psycho-
logical. One form of this motivational or psychological overdemanding-
ness can obtain if, for example, meeting some obligations would be ex-
tremely costly for moral agents and require huge sacrifices. To help peo-
ple in severe distress we would have to abandon our private projects or
some relationships of special concern to people nearer and dearer who
happen to be much better off than those in severe distress. Yet as Schef-
fler has argued, there are several forms of “reasonable partiality”, such as
obligations resulting from personal relationships, membership in com-
munities or personal projects (Scheffler 2010). It might be inappropriate
and overdemanding to ask moral agents to jettison these reasonable
forms of partiality to meet some moral obligation.10
Moral agents who did neglect special relationships in order to follow
the duties stipulated by a given theory might become impersonal duty
performers or utility maximizers (Williams 1981, 14). A moral theory
requiring inhumane, machine-like agents would clearly not fit human
psychology or human nature, because it would be motivationally in-
commensurate. It cannot reasonably be expected of a moral agent, so
the argument goes, to give up all personal relationships and private proj-
ects simply in order to meet the demands of morality.
10 Another form of this argument might stress the marginal utility that is given in
cases where an agent has to invest many resources or has to make huge sacrifices
in order to realize a relatively small improvement for others.
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Furthermore, it might be said to be psychologically overdemanding
for an agent if she particularly should feel obligated to perform some kind
of moral action that millions of other agents – who might be equally ob-
ligated – fail to perform. Under the conditions of general non-compli-
ance with moral obligations the general obligations of individuals could
become weaker and it might appear to be unreasonable to demand that
individuals fully comply with moral duties under conditions of general
non-compliance. Consider the following example: If many or most rel-
atively affluent individuals do not donate (or do not donate enough),
the general duty of helping the needy will certainly not be fulfilled. It
would, from the point of view presented here, be motivationally over-
demanding to ask moral agents to do more than their due share (in order
to avoid overall failure); and it would be motivationally overdemanding
for them to engage into the activity in the first place in order to do their
share, since failure is certain.11
Moral theories can also be theoretically overdemanding, that is, self-
defeating within the boundaries of the given theory. If by following
the moral demands of a given theory the moral agent will experience
or bring about consequences that contradict the presupposed values of
this theory, the theory itself demands something of someone to avoid
the same thing for someone else. If a right to adequate food asks all
moral agents to engage in fighting hunger, a theory demanding actions
that bring the agents themselves into severe poverty would be overde-
manding because self-defeating. Another example of this pattern can be
found in the above-mentioned cases of psychological overdemanding-
ness, where agents might be asked to sacrifice their valuable relationships
in order to meet moral duties. If the moral theory also attributes value to
relationships (and not exclusively to brute survival) then sacrificing all
relationships in order to dedicate one’s life exclusively to fighting
world poverty is at odds with the declared values of the theory.
Generally, the possibility of iteration of moral demands can point to
another theoretical challenge for a moral theory. If an agent is obligated
to perform some kind of action that can be reasonably expected from
her such as donating 10 Euros to charity, why should she not be obliged
to do so repeatedly? Once one duty has been fulfilled, the next one
11 Such claims have been discussed e. g. by Ashford, who argues that non-compli-
ance with moral rules on the part of some make the obligations for others even
more onerous (Ashford 2007, 211). See also the discussion in Murphy 2000 and
in Miller 2011.
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looms. In these cases the continuous application of a moral theory ulti-
mately places very different and potentially excessive demands on
agents.
2.2 The impact of the moral demandingness objection
on socioeconomic rights
Do the different forms of the MDO speak against welfare rights and cor-
responding duties? Initially, one has to accept that much speaks in favor
of the soundness of the MDO. If the existing moral duties are either im-
possible to determine or impossible to realize (technically overdemand-
ing), alien to human lives (psychologically overdemanding), or self-de-
feating (theoretically overdemanding), this proves to be a problem for a
moral theory like the account of welfare rights and corresponding du-
ties. A theory generating excessive and unrealistic obligations might
turn out to be empty insofar as it is little more than wishful thinking,
a well-meant but futile formulation of remote and potentially even con-
tradictory goals.
Indeed the different forms of potential overdemandingness seem to
apply to welfare rights and corresponding duties. They all point to prob-
lems that regularly come up whenever one attempts to identify the du-
ties corresponding to socioeconomic rights. It might be difficult to fully
understand the complex connections that lead to human rights viola-
tions so that it becomes unclear exactly which relation of duty exists.
The resulting responsibilities might exclude one another or simply go
beyond what is realistically feasible for agents. The sacrifices demanded
may be inconvenient or even excessive. The duties may have a negative
impact on the range of “innocent” choices available, that is they may
significantly restrict the options for acting in a morally acceptable
way. They even may endanger other dimensions of our lives that we
cherish or hold in high, potentially even moral esteem. All this shows
why we do indeed have reason to say that the demands generated by
socioeconomic rights are excessively demanding, at least prima facie.
If one thinks that excessive demands have to be avoided because
they are fatal for a moral theory, there are different ways to respond
to this diagnosis. I will mention several of them before showing
which problems are connected with each of them. In conclusion I
will argue for the claim that it does not necessarily speak against a theory
that it generates certain forms of excessive demands.
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First, one could restrict oneself exclusively to talking about rights.
One would then simply stay agnostic and silent on the question of
whether agents have any rights-corresponding duties. A second option
consists in restricting the rights to such a degree that any corresponding
duties do not lead to the MDO. If fighting world poverty would be too
demanding for moral agents, this would exclude the existence of a
human right to adequate food. A third possibility consists in granting
the existence of rights while restricting the corresponding obligations
to an acceptable degree. This would give human rights the status of
goals, ideals or remote ends to be achieved – or perhaps not – at
some later point in the future. In these cases the corresponding duties
would be trimmed down to a technically, motivationally, and theoret-
ically acceptable degree.
In all three cases – agnosticism about duties, restricting rights, re-
stricting obligations – the MDO provides a pre-emptive exculpation of
moral agents who are thus exempted from many moral obligations.
But should we endorse such a practice of pre-emptive exculpation?
Or does it generate problems we should wish to avoid by accepting
the overdemandingness of welfare rights?
2.3 Challenging the moral demandingness objection
In my view, the three possible responses to taking the MDO as a serious
argument against the soundness of a moral theory lead to unacceptable
consequences. Agnosticism about corresponding duties makes human
rights claims nothing but empty talk. If we do not say a word about
who might have which corresponding obligations, any talk about
human rights would be empty and nobody who could potentially do
something about it would feel “a call of moral duty”. In looking exclu-
sively at the rights-side of the two-sided relationship, we risk losing half
of the picture. Hence agnosticism simply neglects an admittedly difficult
but crucial element of the task of securing the legitimate interests of
human agents. This, as a consequence, also makes the talk of rights idle.
Restricting the rights to make them fit an acceptable or convenient de-
gree of obligations would be a revisionary approach. Imagine the fol-
lowing argument: “Striving to secure survival for all would place too
extreme a burden on some. Hence there cannot be such a human
right.” This response introduces a hierarchy where instead we should
show a correspondence between matching elements. It would be epis-
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temically questionable to reduce rights in accordance with an external
standard – external to the relation of correspondence between rights
and duties – of what agents can do or can be reasonably be expected
to do. The reason for accepting a right and a corresponding duty is
the basic interest of a human individual in her fundamental well-
being that has been accepted as legitimate, and not the convenience
for a corresponding duty bearer nor the determination of how much
can be reasonably asked of someone.
Of course, one has to enquire whether there are good reasons to
change the understanding of human rights based on the interests and
welfare of human agents and not on the convenience or realizability
of corresponding obligations. One way out of this dilemma seems to
be to focus on first generation human rights exclusively, which appear
to be much less burdensome, and leave out any second generation
human rights that call for more positive action. But, as already men-
tioned above, the seemingly undisputed set of liberty rights might also
give rise to duties for individuals that go beyond duties of omission.
Think for example of the duty to stop first generation human rights vi-
olations through humanitarian interventions or to secure a functional
legal system in a country to guarantee individuals their right to a fair
trial. If we were to avoid potentially excessive demands resulting from
positive duties, then for the same reasons we would also have to object
to first generation liberty-rights and not just second generation welfare-
rights. Therefore we see that if we restrict rights for reasons of overde-
mandingness it potentially calls into question all human rights, inde-
pendently of their generation, because a potentially overdemanding
positive moral duty might correspond to all human rights.
The third approach to moderate rights-corresponding obligations also
seems problematic. Trimming down the obligations to an acceptable de-
gree would weaken the basic rights significantly and diminish them to
the degree that they become incapable of securing basic elements of
human welfare. If in cases where we think that it is overdemanding
for potential agents to save someone in severe distress the right of the
suffering person simply has no addressee or corresponding duty bearer,
the right as such degenerates. The understanding of rights and duties as
corresponding to one another means we cannot modify one without
impacting the other.
Again, it is important to identify the epistemic standard we would
be using if we were to cut down the degree of an obligation. The stan-
dard of convenience would again be external to the bipolar relation of
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rights and duties. Hence a loosening of the correspondence between
rights and obligations endangers the entire human rights project.
So in all three responses to the MDO we face the severe problem
that human rights talk per se might become empty or vain if trimmed
down to the degree at which it is not too demanding for moral agents.
However, the degree of demandingness for a rights-corresponding duty
holder might seem to be a secondary or even external standard com-
pared to the initial goal of human rights talk, which consists in securing
the welfare and basic interests of individuals that have been accepted as
significant and important. Hence the adequate standard of judgment
about human rights is not the degree of the resulting demandingness,
but rather the importance of the protected dimension of a human life.
From the perspective of a welfare- or interest-based approach to
human rights, the response to the MDO is twofold. On the one hand
we have to accept that the demands of welfare rights can turn out to
be excessive; on the other hand we cannot find a way to restrict the
rights-corresponding duties without endangering the basic interests.
That is why the challenge lies instead in finding an appropriate way
of dealing with overdemandingness.
A general observation may be in order here. Evidently, moral the-
ories essentially become extremely demanding under non-ideal condi-
tions and under conditions of acute crisis.12 In these circumstances over-
demandingness might even be an inherent feature of morality: it could
simply be “part of the game” that to act morally is an extremely de-
manding undertaking. Hence the reproach of being extremely demand-
ing, and potentially too demanding, will be naturally raised against most
types of moral theories. Maybe this is why in the history of ethics many
proponents of different moral theories seemed to agree on the impor-
tance of the “ought implies can” principle. Restricting the demanding-
ness of morality seems appropriate and important for most moral theo-
ries, as – in face of non-ideal conditions – all of them are in need of
some moderating element if they are to avoid the consequence that
even well-intentioned moral agents continuously fail.
12 Pogge has argued that the individual burden to fight world poverty, if distrib-
uted fairly among all possible agents, would be non-excessive (Pogge 2008).
Whether this estimation is true is difficult to determine. However, under con-
ditions of non-compliance the burden for the individual will surely be exces-
sive.
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The question, however, is what we should reasonably expect from a
moral theory, e. g. from a theory of human rights, and whether the con-
tinuous moral failure of agents under non-ideal conditions really is a
flaw of a theory. If the main task of a moral theory consists in defining
what moral agents can be reasonably expected to do, the MDO might
apply and an overdemanding theory might be said to be unsound. After
all, the limits of human knowledge and human psychological and phys-
ical ability are somewhat fixed.13 But if a moral theory is about protect-
ing legitimate interests and needs of individuals and securing their wel-
fare, the primary focus of concern lies not on what moral agents can be
reasonably expected to do but on what moral agents should do. This view
can be called an “ethics-first” approach, because it places the focus of
concern on what should be done instead of on what human agents
can be realistically expected to do.14 In such an ethics-first account
the MDO only comes up at a much later point, to a subordinate degree
and in a different form.
In my view the ethics-first approach properly describes the primary
task of a moral theory. I have argued that the moral demands for agents
are somewhat independent of the given concrete abilities or reasonable
expectations for the moral agent. The demands of morality are extreme-
ly high, often even unreasonably high. This however seems to be the
result of the existence of distress in the world and not a result of
flaws in a moral theory. I would rather put it the other way round: If
the degree of moral obligations in a world like ours were convenient,
or easy to meet, that would be all the worse for the theory. Hence over-
demandingness in moral matters has to be accepted.
Perhaps others will have different feelings about this case. But if one
were to accept the overdemandingness of moral theories, then the
soundness of moral theories could be secured even if they were overde-
13 Nevertheless one should not underestimate the influence of e. g. education on
the motivational capacities of individuals. Cf. Scheffler: “What morality de-
mands depends on the state of the world in morally relevant respects, and
what people are motivated to do depends on how they have been educated
and socialized; and these factors in turn are dependent, in obvious ways, on
the structure and functioning of society.” (Scheffler 1994, 4).
14 The term “ethics first” is from Raymond Geuss, who is critical of such an ideal
theory approach (Geuss 2008, 8). My position is somewhat different from his:
While I agree with much in his critical diagnosis of ideal theory, I am never-
theless convinced that legitimate moral claims and rights are independent
from the question of their realizability.
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manding. The only price to pay is the perhaps undesirable but probably
apt insight that even engaged and well-intentioned moral agents are not
perfect and continuously fail in moral regards. Yet, should this be a
problem for a moral theory? For several reasons – that go back to my
prior arguments about the different dimensions of the MDO – I do
not think so.
Some say that motivational or psychological overdemandingness and
the corresponding bad conscience of moral agents make morality unat-
tractive and scare away potential moral agents from following the de-
mands of morality. This seems to be a debatable empirical question
about the motivational attitude of agents towards an extremely challeng-
ing task.15 One could also argue – quite contrary to this claim – that
lowering the standards of demandingness impedes existing motivations
to act. However, as an empirical question this is not of prior theoretical
concern for moral philosophy, which tries to identify demands of mor-
ality not primarily according to the motivational capacities of given
agents but according to what one reasonably identifies as the morally
right or wrong action.
Others would argue that permanent psychological and motivational
overdemandingness shows how a given moral theory is not fit for
human agents. Again, I would say that this does not provide a substantial
problem. Overdemandingness only shows how much need for moral
action currently exists in the world. Hence, instead of claiming that
such a moral theory would not be fit to human beings, one could
argue that an overdemanding theory fits the state of affairs in our current
world particularly well. After all, under current conditions of world
poverty, e. g., we cannot expect a moral theory to be convenient.
This however might change in a different world. So motivational over-
demandingness can be seen as an acceptable because appropriate feature
of a moral theory in the face of the moral wrongs in our world.
How about technical overdemandingness? Do conditions of uncer-
tainty or the problem of unfeasibility really speak against a moral obli-
gation to do something? This of course depends upon what you under-
stand a moral obligation to be. According to my view, the question
“Who should do what?” is reasonable even if it cannot be answered
with perfect accuracy. In many cases there may be insurmountable epis-
temic difficulties in determining the right action, but the idea that there
15 Psychological research about external influences on motivation and decision-
making will be necessary here. Cf. e. g. Ryan/Deci 2000.
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is only one morally right action is generally misleading. Instead, there
may be different sets of morally demanded actions that – while being
mutually exclusive – nevertheless are morally demanded, maybe even
to the same degree. However, I cannot see why this form of epistemic
uncertainty should speak against a moral theory as such. For the subject
matter of ethics, only a lower degree of precision and unambiguousness
can be reasonably expected, as Aristotle had already argued. Further-
more, if one is incapable of performing some of the demanded actions,
this does not affect whether they should be done. Incapability only gives
a moral agent a reason or an explanation for not doing them. In these
cases the agent would fail to perform a morally demanded action; how-
ever, she might not fail – or fail again – concerning another morally de-
manded action. If one takes a moral obligation to be a moral judgment
about the moral quality of an action in question, then the actual unfea-
sibility of this action does not affect this quality. The unfeasibility – as
the uncertainty mentioned before – does not provide a substantial argu-
ment against the soundness of a moral theory.
Now what about theoretical overdemandingness? Can a moral theory
reasonably demand that people sacrifice things of equal moral value in
their own lives in order to fight a moral wrong somewhere else? This
objection has to be carefully scrutinized. No moral theory I am familiar
with explicitly demands something like this. Even Peter Singer’s ex-
tremely demanding suggestion about moral obligations in face of
world poverty does not say that a moral agent should cause himself to
sink below the level of well-being that he is attempting to remedy.
The underlying distinction to be made here is between a moral obliga-
tion on the one hand and actually doing something on the other. Being
morally obligated to do something is having a moral reason for perform-
ing some action. Certainly we have good reasons to act in order, say, to
fight world poverty, and this obligation is extremely demanding, given
the extreme suffering of others. Regarding the theoretical overdemand-
ingness it is important to see that the moral obligation to help, that is,
the existence of a moral reason to help, persists even in cases where
we would have to sacrifice our own lives and well-being or neglect
our other obligations. But it will be one reason among many that is gen-
erated by the (human-rights-secured) needs of others, not the only reason
we have to guide our lives. And it has not been claimed that we should
always follow each of the moral obligations we identify in the complex
lives we lead, even if each of them constitutes a strong reason for doing
so. Theoretical overdemandingness may be an acceptable, even a neces-
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sary feature of a moral theory that is based in a world of severe, prevent-
able suffering in which moral agents nevertheless are engaged in many
different relations and activities. What we have to avoid is focusing all
our moral concern and reasoning on only one dimension of our multi-
dimensional, active human lives.
3. The demandingness of morality
I have argued that some obligations resulting from a moral theory of
welfare rights are extremely or even unreasonably demanding.
Rights-corresponding duties can be technically, psychologically, and
theoretically overdemanding. I take such overdemandingness of welfare
rights to be rather a result of the state of the world in which massive
violations of human rights take place and cause hunger, poverty, and
suffering. Overdemandingness under these conditions matches the ex-
cessive distress and should not be seen as a flaw of a theory of human
rights. Hence the options of being silent on rights-corresponding duties,
restricting these duties or even restricting the rights are not sufficiently
supported by the MDO.
Yet, accepting these extreme, even unreasonable obligations is only
one element in the general undertaking of moral reasoning in order to
allow for considered moral action. These obligations are reasons that
speak in favor of some action. However, different obligations arise in
complex human lives and will have to be weighed against one another.
That is why even under the condition that my argument is sound and
that excessive human rights-corresponding obligations are justified, I
have not argued that moral agents should always and exclusively follow
this call of duty or jettison all other obligations, plans and activities in
their lives in order to dedicate all energy exclusively to fighting hunger,
poverty, and suffering. While we have to make our reasoned moral
choices, the moral obligations corresponding to ongoing human rights
violations persist and are neither diminished nor eliminated by the
fact that they may be extremely or unreasonably demanding.
All restrictions of human rights-corresponding obligations to a more
convenient or more “reasonable” degree disrespect the legitimate claims
of those whose important basic interests are violated and question the
status of these interests as protected by a human right. Hence the appro-
priate response to a diagnosis of overdemandingness is to listen to the
multiple obligations one may have and deal with them as well as possi-
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ble. It is certainly not appropriate to deafen oneself or, in calling it a flaw
of a theory, to pre-emptively exculpate oneself for failing to live up to
them. Being incapable of fulfilling all duties does not disburden us from
trying, even if in the end even well-intentioned moral agents will nec-
essarily have to accept their at least partial, ongoing failure.
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